Due diligence has a stable if malleable, presence in international law often starting as soft law guidance that over time hardens into legal rules and principles. While it is possible to refer to elements of due diligence broadly, the exact scope of the concept depends on the regulatory or international law context in which it is usedsuch as environmental law, human rights related to responsible business conduct, the elimination of violence against women, or rules around the supply of conflict minerals.
The EU has chosen due diligence as the vehicle to support and balance the effective implementation of benefit-sharing commitments set out in EUR 511/2014.
1 While one of the stated aims of the EUR is related to 'improving conditions for legal certainty in connection with the utillisation of GR and ATK' 2 the evolving nature of access and benefit-sharing (ABS) related behavior necessitates principles that can guide individuals and institutions when faced with unprecedented circumstances.
There are three critical and interconnected reasons that drive the need for this Recommendation. First due diligence lends itself well to constructive ambiguity that can be harnessed to build consensus around best practices. Secondly due diligence as a positive obligation is separate from the underlying responsibility to follow ABS rules in provider countries. Thirdly, if due diligence is not tethered to the foundational responsibility to respect ABS rules, it may encourage 'tickbox' compliance that will frustrate the purpose of the Nagoya Protocol and the international consensus achieved under the Convention of Biological Diversity.
This document is presented as a first guide to developing principles of due diligence that are specific to the access and benefit-sharing context in international law and as a guide to scientists, universities, technology managers and businesses navigating the line between legally required and ethically aspirational behavior. It is hoped that the community will return to this document to update and consolidate practices over time.
The Recommendation is the product of a Symposium on the Use and Circulation of Genetic Resources, conducted on the 11 and 12th of September at the London School of Economics. All participants are co-producers of this document. The Principles were informed by the results of a survey on 98 EU users of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge. The project is led by Dr Siva Thambisetty Associate Professor of Law, LSE and was developed as part of the INMARE project funded by EU Horizon2020. The Protocol requires that benefits arising from the utilization of Genetic Resources (GK) and Associated Traditional Knowledge (ATK) are shared fairly and equitably, thereby contributing to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Among other aims, the Preamble recognizes the potential role of access and benefit-sharing (ABS) to contribute to achieving Millennium Development Goals, now referred to as the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
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The Nagoya Protocol is addressed to State Parties, and does not apply directly to users and providers of genetic resources. In order for it to be applicable to individuals or non-State entities it must first be implemented at the national level. EU Regulation 511/2014 implements the Nagoya Protocol in the European Union by obligating Member States to legislate at the national level.
The effective implementation of the Nagoya Protocol through EUR 511/2014 relies on users of genetic resources, including scientists, pursuing a due diligence standard of conduct. A course of conduct that is diligent and reasonable under the Regulation must also align with the moral and legal responsibility to support the effective implementation of the Nagoya Protocol.
To this end, due diligence is a springboard rather than a cap, on justice and ethically minded behavior.
The provisions of the EUR 511/2014 as enforced in national legislations in Member States will be interpreted and negotiated by those to whom it is addressed, as compliance practices related to the access and use of genetic resources evolve. This
Recommendation is addressed to scientists and other users, and to the ecosystem of institutions that support the work they do. The compliance ecosystem in Europe, which includes scientific institutions, research councils, universities, research networks, research publications, businesses and corporate entities, must support users in their pursuit of due diligence in a manner that is in keeping with the spirit and intent of the Nagoya Protocol.
This Recommendation is one of the first interdisciplinary attempts internationally to give content to the meaning of due diligence in an ABS context.
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It builds on the due diligence requirements set out in the Regulation and the official Guidance document on EUR 511/20147, but does not replace legal advice on access requirements in the EUR or national ABS regulations in specific provider countries. This is a living document, which we hope will be updated by the community of users newly tasked with obligations intended to realize the Nagoya Protocol. 1.2 For multinational commercial entities general due diligence includes internationally recognized standards of responsible business conduct (RBC) as specified by OECD guidelines.
General and Essential Characteristics of

1.3
Due diligence must be appropriate to an individual or entity's circumstances, including the limitations of individuals working within business or corporate relationships.
1.4
Due diligence processes are ongoing and responsive. They include feedback loops so that individuals and entities can progressively learn. They seek to prevent adverse implications and involve multiple processes and objectives.
1.5
It is recommended that each person or entity as user address their own responsibility with respect to adverse impacts of their action or non-action to the best of their ability.
1.6
Due diligence is a guide, and should not be treated as a cap, on actions that facilitate effective implementation of the EUR 511/2014 and objectives of the Nagoya Protocol.
Due Diligence in an ABS context
2.1 Due diligence is a standard of conduct that is tethered to the foundational responsibility to mitigate adverse ABS related implications in light of the objectives of the Nagoya Protocol. . In international law due diligence is normally not a standard of result, only of conduct. EUR 511/2014 appears to introduce a limited standard of result extending to PIC (or equivalent) and MAT only. In EUR 511/2014 this is not however a standard of result that extends to ensuring that fair and equitably sharing of benefits takes place, the assumption is that legally enforceable contractual obligations represented by PIC and MAT suffice to ensure this. Notably, PIC and MAT are only needed if a specific country has regulations in place that require PIC and Mat. A country can decide not to require PIC and MAT. See Art 6.1 of the Nagoya Protocol.
Due diligence in an ABS
11 EUR 511/2014 applies to 'utilization by users in the EU', and Art 4 that sets out the obligations of users only uses the term 'ascertain' with respect to due diligence by users based in the EU. In Article 4, there is no explicit reference to 'access' and whether due diligence must also be applied when it comes to following provider country laws. However this can be gathered from the wording of recital 24 and 9 ('It is also essential to prevent the utilisation in the Union of genetic resources or traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, which were not accessed in accordance with the national access and benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory requirements of a Party to the Nagoya Protocol, and to support the effective implementation of benefit-sharing commitments set out in mutually agreed terms between providers and users'); and that users also have to 'ascertain' in Art 4 that benefits are fairly and equitably shared upon mutually agreed terms, in accordance with any applicable legislation or regulatory requirements.
12 While due diligence obligations of business organization under human rights guidance is not legally enforceable, there are many tools developed by NGOs to assess 'impact' and 'adverse implications' of actions taken on human rights. Similar efforts must be made by scientific bodies to explain and extrapolate the proximate and projected implications of not achieving the objectives of the Nagoya Protocol.
or its equivalent and mutually agreed terms (MAT) should have (but have not) been obtained and the user cannot obtain the same, utilization must be discontinued.
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2.3 The obligation of result in the EUR 511/2014 does not extend to ensuring contractual performance of mutually agreed benefit-sharing. Contractual performance would nonetheless benefit from due diligence standards of conduct because the foundational responsibility to facilitate the effective implementation of the Nagoya Protocol remains.
2.4
Due diligence is not a defense against liability under provider country laws.
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Adequate efforts must be made to investigate and comply with local ABS laws at all times.
Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement
3.1 Where due diligence is related to provider country interaction, stakeholder engagement including with local communities who hold traditional knowledge, is best characterized by two-way communication and good faith on part of the participants on both sides.
Impact studies and modeling of adverse implications
4.1 Initiatives to develop impact studies and models of adverse implications of conduct that falls short of diligent will help clarify the purpose and scope of due diligence. Adverse implications include frustrating the objectives of the Nagoya Protocol.
4.2
These impact studies will complement the development of best practices and tether such practices to the avoidance of adverse implications and to furthering the objectives of the Nagoya Protocol and EUR 511/2014. 6.3 If delaying benefit-sharing until a point at which there are benefits to be shared, due diligence must take account of the fact that provider countries often have little or no leverage on triggers for contractual performance.
Best practices and sector specific guidance
6.4
Benefit-sharing can be as ambitious and aspirational as possible once all legal and procedural standards of conduct are met.
13 See n 10 above.
14 Agreements here refer to private law contracts that establish conditions of access, use of resources and sharing of benefits including in the pursuit of commercial and non-commercial research.
15 It can be challenging to enforce any international contract. ABS contracts present additional difficulties. In a context in which harm sought to be avoided is difficult to conceptualize and external verification of performance triggers is nearly impossible, it is important to realize that that ABS contractual performance is in reality, mostly voluntary.
16 Young and Tvedt point out that given the difficulty of ensuring larger, more speculative benefits further down the line the temptation to settle for immediate and tangible benefits instead, is high for two reasons. First a secure small payment is often considered to be comparable in value to a speculative large payment. Second, a payment now is generally thought of as more valuable than a payment later. Young and Tvedt Drafting Successful Benefit Sharing Contracts (Brill 2017) p 141. Additionally there is nothing in the EUR that specifies when benefit-sharing obligations must be fulfilled, or how or when the provider's benefit-share should be calculated.
17 EUR 511/2014 does not provide a scheme for benefit-sharing beyond due diligence in compliance with local provider country laws.
18 As in the human rights context, this might require asking difficult questions of collaborators and colleagues. Such scrutiny however is essential to ensure that contractual intent at the beginning of the access process is not frustrated.
19 See Art 7 on scope of disclosure obligations in EUR 2017/821.
6.5
Benefits upfront in favor of delayed and speculative but potentially larger benefits must be agreed in as transparent a manner as possible. of genetic resources used in publication or patent applications, even if they are representationally, structurally or functionally transformed in the research and utilization process.
8.4
There are diverse immediate sources of traditional knowledge including those documented in scientific publications. If the user knows the indigenous community who holds the Associated Traditional Knowledge, disclosure in publications or patent applications should be traced to the community rather than just the scientific publication reporting on the traditional knowledge.
8.5
Transparency in use of all relevant traditional knowledge can aid efforts to map and demarcate traditional knowledge that is merely relevant from cases where traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources is tangibly used.
8.6
Any track and trace methods used as part of diligent conduct should aim to acknowledge legal track and trace as well as scientific and technical efforts to do so.
8.4
Transparency must ideally account for discontinuous scientific use that might require technical and scientific information to be kept beyond the legally required 20-year period.
9. Chain of custody of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge:
9.1 In case of genetic resources accessed through intermediaries, it is prudent to obtain information regarding the chain of custody namely the succession of commercial and non-commercial operators who have used the genetic resource. 23 One of the ways in which to do this might be to assume due diligence in compliance for all users, which will be retracted in case of non-compliance. The consequent loss aversion could become a powerful incentive to comply.
Technical and scientific constraints
10.1 There may be extraordinary cases, such as public health concerns of international dimension where due diligence in the obligatory sense may make adhering to scientific protocols difficult.
22
In such cases, and in the absence of sector specific guidance, it is advisable to assess whether technical and scientific protocols suffice as part of the appropriate, proportional and objective standard of due diligence.
Derivatives and Digital Sequence Information
11.1 Users should aim to apply the principles in this Recommendation to digital sequence information and derivatives to the best of their ability, and to apply a standard of conduct that does not frustrate the effective implementation of the Nagoya Protocol. 
Networks and organizations in
